Abstract
Introduction
The emergence of standardized languages, such as the eXtensible Markup Language (W3C, 2004a), the Resource Description Framework (W3C, 2004b) , and the Web Ontology Language (W3C, 2004c), supports automated data management. These languages provide simple syntax and precise semantics that are understandable to both humans and machines. The envisioned Semantic Web (Berners-Lee, Hendler & Lassila, 2001; Hendler, Berners-Lee & Miller, 2002) and the applications taking advantage of the Semantic Web will be built upon these languages. A necessary requirement for these future applications is that they provide information security and privacy.
Existing security solutions for the Web target specific areas like trust management, secure Web services, access control models for XML, and Web privacy (see Thuraisingham, 2002 for an overview). A promising new research trend aims to incorporate semantics in security models like semantic-aware access control and policy specification. Although the number of research and development efforts to provide security for the Semantic Web is increasing, only a few researchers consider the inference problem in this context (Farkas & Jajodia, 2002) .
Inferences over semantically enhanced data and metadata play a fundamental role on the Semantic Web. Indirect disclosures resulting from the inference capabilities of the Semantic Web are similar to the inference problem studied in statistical and relational databases (Farkas & Jajodia, 2002; Jajodia & Meadows, 1995) . However, the characteristics of these two environments differ from the perspectives of (1) data completeness, (2) scope of data control, (3) data models, (4) amount of data (scalability), and (5) data quality. These characteristics affect not only the detection of indirect data accesses but also the applicable removal methods. For example, in traditional databases, removal of an inference channel is usually performed by limiting accesses to data yielding the unwanted inference. However, in the open and decentralized environment of the Semantic Web, some of the data yielding unwanted inferences may be outside of the protected domain. In this case, removal of the inference channel may not be possible by limiting data accesses. New approaches like leakage of misleading information need to be considered.
The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the risk of unwanted inferences in the context of the Semantic Web. Our claim is that the risk of such inferences has increased due to large-scale, semantically enhanced, and automated data processing (Stoica & Farkas, 2002 , 2003 . We compare the inference threat on the Semantic Web to the inference problem studied in traditional databases. We study two types of inferences: (1) entailments defined by the formal semantics of the Resource Description Framework (RDF) and the RDF Schema (RDFS) and (2) inferences supported by semantic languages like the Web Ontology Language (OWL). Indirect data disclosure may occur due to the existence of replicated data with inconsistent security classification and inferences that disclose disallowed data or data association. Existing access control models that are applicable to Semantic Web data and metadata do not prevent indirect disclosure, thus are unable to protect against inference-based attacks. Since inferences are considered a fundamental activity on the Semantic Web, we believe that it is necessary to consider their impact on security.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. The Semantic Web section contains a brief overview of the Semantic Web technologies. The Database Inference Problem section presents the inference problem in traditional databases. The Inferences Problem on the Semantic Web section discusses possible inference threats on the Semantic Web, including RDF-based inferences and ontology-driven inferences. The Security Analysis and Future Trends section lists the distinguishing characteristics of the Semantic Web inference problem, outlines prevention methods, and identifies future research areas. The last section, a summary, concludes the chapter.
The Semantic Web
This section gives a brief overview of the Semantic Web and Web inference engines. For detailed description of the related concepts, the reader should consult the Web pages of the World Wide Web Consortium (http:// www.w3c.org) and the Semantic Web Community Portal (http:// www.semanticweb.org).
XML, RDF, and Ontology Languages
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML), XML schema, Resource Description Framework (RDF), and RDF schema are the basic components of the Semantic Web. XML (W3C, 2004a) separates data content from its presentation. XML syntax supports interoperation between heterogeneous domains. Recent research considers XML from the perspective of data management (Abiteboul, Buneman & Suciu, 2000; Buneman et al., 2003; Thuraisingham, 2002) . These works aim to develop concepts and tools for XML that are similar to the ones in traditional database systems. XML provides simple syntax without formal semantics. RDF and RDFS (W3C, 2004b) are intended to describe metadata about Web resources. They represent a knowledgeoriented approach with formal semantics and the notion of entailment. Inference rules are defined by these entailments. Ontology languages (Erdman & Studer, 1999; Horrocks, Patel-Schneider & van Harmelen, 2003 
Semantic Web Inference
The main distinguishing characteristics of the Semantic Web, in contrast to the current Web, are the presence of machine understandable representations of data semantics and inferences derived from them. The research of Shah (1998) , Sheth (1999) , and Patel and Sheth (2001) addresses the need of modeling data semantics. The main application targeted by these research activities is intelligent data integration. RDF, RDFS, and ontology languages support formal semantics and provable deductions. The problem of building formal models of Web inferences has been targeted by several researchers (Boley, 2000; Grosof, Horrocks, Volz & Decker, 2003; Horrocks, 2002; Horrocks et al., 2003; McGuinness et al., 2001; RuleML, 2004) . In addition to the theoretical models, software tools like Swish (Klyne, 2003) , Haskell (2004) , Racer (2004) , and SweetJess (Grosof, Horrocks, Volz & Decker, 2003) have been implemented.
Research that considers indirect privacy violations via data mining (Clifton, Kantarcioglu & Vaidya, 2002; Oliveira, Zaiane & Saygin, 2004) and data linkage (Subramaniam & Yang, 2003; Wang et al., 2004) has emerged recently. Privacy preserving data mining is motivated by the need to protect sensitive data as data mining applications grow. Privacy concerns include the personal information about individual users and information about the activities of a group of users. Work on data linkage addresses the problem of disclosing personal data from aggregate information or from separately-released, nonconfidential data of an individual. Prevention methods are based on techniques like perturbation and generalization.
Database Inference Problem
Inference channels in databases occur when sensitive information can be disclosed from non-sensitive data and metadata. The inference problem involves the detection and removal of inference channels. Jajodia and Meadows (1995) and Farkas and Jajodia (2002) present overviews of the inference problem in relational databases. Metadata in databases may correspond to database constraints, such as database dependencies and integrity constraints, or outside information, such as domain knowledge and query correlations. Depending on the level of accuracy by which the sensitive information is revealed, we can distinguish between full or partial disclosure.
To illustrate a simple inference channel via integrity constraints, consider the Credit Card database over schema (Name, Available credit, Max. credit, Balance) , where the Balance information (i.e., how much a customer owes) is confidential. Clearly, by revealing the Available credit and Max. credit data and the integrity constraint Balance = Max credit -Available credit, any user could calculate the Balance.
Inference Control Strategies
While no general solution to the inference problem exists (Jajodia & Meadows, 1995) , several methods have been developed that provide protection against specific types of unwanted inferences. Inference channel detection and removal methods can be characterized into two main groups based on the time of the inference channel analysis: (1) during database-design time and (2) during query-processing time.
The main advantages of the first approach is that it is usually fast since it only considers the database schema and the corresponding constraints without the actual instances. In addition, the analysis does not slow the performance of the database usage. However, this approach may result in overclassification because an inference channel may not materialize in a particular database instance. Inference channel detection during query-processing provides maximal data availability because all disclosed data can be evaluated to verify the existence of an inference channel. However, there are two main disadvantages in this approach. First, it is usually more expensive and time consuming than the design time approach and affects system usage. Second, the refusal and answer of the queries themselves may create an inference channel.
Inference Problem Modeling
Several approaches have been developed by the database security community to model the inference problem. In particular, two of these approaches seem to be relevant to the Semantic Web inference problem: (1) logic-based and (2) semantic relationship modeling-based.
Logic-based approaches, like the ones presented by Thuraisingham (1987) and Brodsky, Farkas, and Jajodia (2000) , have been shown to be promising for detecting inference channels and establishing formal properties of the inference algorithms. They model the database as a collection of facts and apply metadata (inference rules) to these facts to deduce additional information. This approach is related to the Semantic Web knowledge representation using Description and First Order Logic (Boley, 2000 (Boley, , 2001 Grosof, Gandhe & Finin, 2003; Grosof, Horrocks, Volz & Decker 2003; Horrocks, 2002; Sowa, 2000) . The advantages of this approach are the clear formalism and the decidability results, allowing the establishment of assurance of the techniques. However, logic-based systems have high complexity, making it expensive for large applications like database systems or the Web.
A different approach (Hinke, Delugach & Wolf, 1997) uses semantic modeling techniques to represent relationships among data items and detects inference channels. Inference detection is performed on semantic or conceptual graphs that allow reasoning about database entities and domain knowledge. Inference channels are detected by identifying multiple paths between entities such that some of the paths are not visible to the users. This approach shows similarities to the semantic relationship modeling of Web data (Sheth, 1999) .
The Inferences Problem on the Semantic Web
Semantic Web inferences are defined by the semantics of the languages used for building the Semantic Web. We start out with RDF-based inferences, followed by ontology driven inferences.
RDF-Based Inferences
RDF statements are binary relational assertions. These assertions may entail other assertions that may not be explicitly represented in the original set of RDF statements. The model-theoretic semantics of RDF define the set of possible worlds based on a set of RDF assertions. Intuitively, a set S of RDF statements entails an RDF statement s, if for any world, whenever S is true then s must also be true. Entailment allows generating assertions that may not be explicitly stored but could be inferred from RDF data. From the security perspective, this derivable information must also be incorporated in the authorization framework. Two fundamental questions must be answered: (1) how to classify automatically the derived data and (2) how to detect unauthorized data accesses via derived data.
RDF Semantics (2004) present entailment rules for RDF and RDFS. The authors distinguish among simple, RDF, RDFS, and extensional entailment rules. These rules, along with the RDF statements, allow formal inferences.
Researchers, like Sowa (2000) and Boley (2000 Boley ( , 2001 , developed logicbased approaches to model RDF, RDFS, and possible inferences. For example, Sowa (2000) showed that the expressive power of RDF is the same as existential-conjunctive subset of first-order logic.
Existing inference engines operate on the sub-class-of and the sub-propertyof constructs of RDFS. These simple inferences may lead to security violations as mentioned above. For example, assume that the following three assertions of our model (for simplicity, we omitted the namespaces):
1. These three assertions together entail that United is a company that has a deficit, that is, United rdf:type Companies-With-Deficit. Assuming that United wanted to keep its financial status confidential, the newly generated assertion violates the security requirements. However, without considering the entailment, the three assertions alone do not violate the security.
RDF and Metadata
In addition to entailment defined by RDF and RDFS semantics, complex relationships provide additional inferencing capabilities. Consider the scenario when the RDF data contains the following facts: (1) Ann is the parent of Mary; (2) Mary is the parent of Pete; (3) Ann is female; and (4) Ann is the grandmother of Pete. Assume that Pete would like to keep it confidential that Ann is his grandmother. A simple solution is to classify the fourth fact "Ann is the grandmother of Pete" confidential. Unfortunately, while this controls the direct disclosure of the fact that Pete is Ann's grandchild, it does not prevent the inference engine to infer this fact given the other three assertions and the following two rules:
1. if X is the parent of Y and Y is the parent of Z then X is the grandparent of Z 2. if X is a grandparent of Y and X is female then X is the grandmother of Y To our best knowledge, no access control model exists for RDF that would prevent unwanted inferences based on the above inferences.
Ontology-Based Inferences
Initial studies of the inference problem via ontologies on the Semantic Web are given in Farkas and Stoica (2003) and Stoica and Farkas (2004) . The authors target unwanted inferences in semantically enhanced and publicly available XML documents. The XML documents provide simple syntax. Mappings from the XML documents to ontology concept hierarchies supply the semantics. The authors present methods to generalize XML tags according to the ISA relationship in the concept hierarchy. The basic assumption is that if two tags can be generalized to the same concept, then they are semantically related. The authors set a number of measurements, such as number of generalization steps, relative difference between the tags, and the specificity of the concept, in order to measure the correctness of the assumption that the two tags are related. The inference detection is performed at the schema level. Based on the users' preferences, probable inference channels can be further evaluated by datalevel analysis. The authors study two specific problems. The first problem is the detection of replicated data in distributed XML repositories where data may have different syntax and structure. Security violations occur when the replicated data have inconsistent or contradictory security classifications. The second problem concerns the detection of confidential data associations that can be deduced from publicly available associations. Both modules are incorporated in Ontology Guided XML Security Engine (Oxsegin).
Replicated Data Inference
In Stoica and Farkas (2004) , the authors propose a method to detect replicated XML data with conflicting security classifications. Their main technical contribution is the development of the Probabilistic Inference Engine used by Oxsegin. The inference engine operates on DTD files and uses the ISA relationship in the corresponding ontology to identify XML elements that can be generalized to the same concept. Users can specify the number of permitted generalization steps, eliminating the possibility that all tags are unified under a common concept. If two elements can be generalized to the same concept, they are called ontologically equivalent. Security violations occur when two ontologically equivalent tags have inconsistent or conflicting security classifications. These tags are marked with a security violation pointer (SVP). A confidence level coefficient (CLC) is attached to every SVP, representing the level of assurance of the derived security breach.
Consider the following example from the paper of Stoica and Farkas (2004) . Figure 1 shows two XML documents over the same data but with different syntax and structure. The first XML document is classified Secret. The second XML document is classified Confidential. A human observer of these two XML documents would conclude that they represent the same data, that is, discover the relationships between document and paper, author and writer, and that the security classifications of the replicas are inconsistent. The authors present a probabilistic inference engine and security module that reach the same conclusions for a predefined set of XML documents, corresponding ontologies, and security policy.
Correlated Data Inference
In Farkas and Stoica (2003) , the authors propose a method to detect unauthorized disclosure of sensitive associations. They propose a Correlated Stoica & Farkas, 2004) Inference Procedure to detect data associations such that the security classifications of the associations are inconsistent. The procedure incorporates syntactic and structural differences of the XML documents and uses the ISA relationship to generalize tags to common concepts. Similar to the inference engine for replicated data, the method works on DTD files.
To represent this problem, consider the three XML files shown in Figure 2 . The air-show information (Figure 2a ) and the drinking water basin (Figure 2b ) documents are classified public. The critical infrastructure file (Figure 2c ) contains the sensitive association between an army base and its water reservoir. This association is classified secret. 
Figure 3. Illustration of discovering confidential association
Use of the ontology shown in Figure 3b allows the generation of a public-level association between base and water source thus revealing the secret information. Figure 3 illustrates the unification procedure.
Security Analysis and Future Trends
Current studies of inference control address only the ISA relationship among the concepts. Further research is needed to integrate complex relationships and their properties. In addition, security solutions need to be tailored to the special characteristics of the Semantic Web inferences.
Characteristics of the Semantic Web Inferences
Semantic Web inferences have characteristics similar to the inference problem studied in traditional databases. However, there are also several differences. These differences are best viewed from the perspectives of (1) data completeness, (2) scope of data control, (3) data model, (4) amount of data (scalability), and (5) data quality.
The information content of the open and dynamic Semantic Web can only be viewed as incomplete. Traditional inference control methods address complete databases. Their properties, with respect to soundness and completeness, need to be re-evaluated in the context of the Web context. Also, since the inference procedure may generate new data that is not explicitly stored in the database, mechanisms that automatically assign security classifications to such data must be developed.
The openness of the Web leads to another distinguishing characteristic, the scope of the controlled area. In traditional databases, it is generally assumed that the security officer has control over all data items leading to an undesired inference. This assumption does not hold true for Web data where inferences may use data residing in someone else's domain. Traditional prevention methods, based on limiting access to data leading to unwanted inferences, are not applicable in this case.
Another distinguishing characteristic of Semantic Web inferences are that they reason over heterogeneous data like XML, RDF, relational, and so forth. This will limit the applicability of traditional prevention methods that focused mainly on relational databases.
Scalability is a critical property for any practical application. One of the most overwhelming features of the Web is its size. Assuming the existence of ontologies and semantically annotated data, inference engines must process large amount of documents.
Additional characteristics include the problem of unambiguously identifying protection objects, for example, XML substructures, RDF resources, and the quality and trustworthiness of the data and metadata used for the inference. These issues must be carefully evaluated when establishing the assurance of the inference control. Current research addresses only a small set of these problems.
Future Trends
In the previous section, we presented some of the currently investigated aspects of Semantic Web inferences. Tools to support large-scale metadata extractions and semantic annotations of heterogeneous data are being developed. Some of the problems mentioned in this chapter are currently being analyzed from the perspectives of data integration and Semantic Web inferencing. Collaborations among these researchers and security experts are necessary to achieve highassurance, practical systems.
Our aim is to develop security models and methods that will not only restrain interoperation but also satisfy security and privacy requirements. The first line of defense of data security is access control. However, to answer the question of what information must be protected and from whom, we need to consider the identity of the protection object and that it may not be explicitly stored but can be derived from the existing data. Authorization models that identify protection objects based on their semantics rather than syntax and are capable of handling extensional and intentional data within a single framework need to be developed.
Another crucial aspect of the Semantic Web inference problem is how to remove detected inference channels. If controlled data items are part of the unwanted inferences, then the removal of an inference channel is possible by restricting access to these data items. However, if the inference channel is raised by non-controlled public data, then removal of the inference channel becomes difficult and costly. Our main assumption is that we only have control over the data and metadata contained within our domain.
Studying Web inferences requires that we answer several crucial questions. Some of these questions are currently being studied from the perspective of providing efficient inference capabilities. However, they have not been studied from the perspective of security and privacy. In addition to the previous discussion, the following questions must be answered.
• What is the assurance of the developed model and how do we deal with inconsistencies? Unbounded Web-based applications do not conform to the traditional database security models for security assurance and require new definitions for concepts like completeness and correctness. Furthermore, trustworthiness of sites and distributed data depositories have a major affect on evaluating correctness and completeness.
• How do we deal with semantic inconsistencies and ambiguities? Data and metadata available on the Web may be incorrect, leading to inconsistencies and contradictions. Simple conflict resolution methods, like negative takes precedence, are not sufficient to resolve conflict. Methods that allow the users to judge the correctness of the data need to be incorporated in the inference engine to support flexible conflict resolution.
• How do we need to control semantic information? Semantic information, for example, metadata, plays a significant role in providing interoperations. However, it is realistic to assume that levels of interoperations may differ among the participants, requiring that they can access semantic information at different levels. For example, a company may allow others to access general information about the company, but only trusted organizations are allowed to access the full organizational metadata.
• How can we prevent unwanted inferences? In general, there is no silver bullet to remove unwanted inferences. However, it has been shown that solutions exist for specific problems. Unwanted inference prevention on the Semantic Web may involve techniques ranging from information hiding to the introduction of noise or may have to be addressed in a noninformation technology manner like increased physical security.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a brief overview of current Semantic Web technologies and related security models. The main focus of the chapter is the evaluation of the security threats from unwanted inferences. Our aim is to encourage researchers to develop security paradigms that do not limit interoperability unnecessarily while satisfying security and privacy requirements. Our belief is that the inference problem is indeed a security threat against data confidentiality and privacy on the Semantic Web. Future works to study these inferences and develop prevention methods are needed. In particular, complex relationships leading to unwanted inferences need to be studied. Also, we believe that RDF and ontology languages play a significant role in developing the Semantic Web. However, no security model exists that addresses the security needs of these technologies. The works of Stoica and Farkas (2001 , 2003 present an initial analysis of the related problems; however, the authors only address inferences via the ISA relationship. Methods capable of handling complex, possibly interdomain relationships (Sheth, 1999; Patel & Sheth, 2001 ), need to be developed. Further, formal assurance of these methods needs to be established with respect to soundness and completeness of the methods. This is especially important when considering the open nature of the Semantic Web. Development of a satisfactory solution for the Semantic Web inference problem requires the collaboration between security experts, Semantic Web developers, and domain experts.
